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Had Article 52 of the ICSID Convention1 been drafted
expansively, ICSID parties would know that they face the common
prospect of a two-staged process, arbitration followed by ad hoc
committee review.
Article 52 is, however, drafted restrictively, and its text creates the
reasonable expectation of parties to ICSID cases that annulment will
be available only for egregious injustices of a procedural nature and
not in situations where the ad hoc committee disagrees with the
substantive decision rendered by the tribunal.2 ICSID’s annulment
history has mostly been faithful to the language of Article 52. But
there have been periods when annulment has been the norm, or an
omnipresent threat.
ICSID’s annulment virus first appeared in the Klöckner v.
Republic of Cameroon3 decision in 1983, and took a worse form in
the Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indonesia I annulment in 1985.4
The virus then lay dormant for some 25 years, re-appearing with the
ad hoc Committee decisions in Sempra Energy International v.
Argentine Republic,5 Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Argentine
1. Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and
Nationals of Other States art. 52, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1965, 17 U.S.T.
1270, 575 U.N.T.S. 159 [hereinafter ICSID Convention].
2. The grounds for ICSID annulment are similar to, but more restrictive than,
those set out in the UNCITRAL Model Law for review of arbitral awards, yet,
courts have been more deferential than ad hoc Committees to arbitral awards. Juan
Fernández-Armesto, Different Systems for the Annulment of Investment Awards,
ICSID REV. – FOREIGN INV. L. J. 128, 145 (2011).
3. Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH v. Rep. of Cameroon, ICSID Case No.
ARB/81/2, Decision on Annulment (May 3, 1985), 2 ICSID REP. 95 (1994)
[hereinafter Klöckner].
4. Amco Asia Corp. v. the Rep. of Indon., ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1,
Decision on Annulment (May 16, 1986), 1 ICSID REP. 509 (1993) [hereinafter
Amco I].
5. Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision
on Annulment (June 29, 2010), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1550En&caseId=C8
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Republic,6 and Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Service Worldwide v.
Republic of the Philippines,7 all decided in 2010.8 Two decisions
from September 2011 (Continental Casualty Corp. v. Argentine
Republic9 and Togo Electricité v. Republic of Togo (“GDF”)10)
suggest that the second viral phase may have been short lived.
Following the decisions in Klöckner and Amco I, the problems
caused by excessive annulments were clearly perceived. Those
decisions were heavily criticized by both academics and practitioners
for their “hair trigger” approach to annulment.11 Following Klöckner,
a number of decisions over a period of some 20 years adopted a
much more cautious approach to the review of ICSID awards.12 This
[hereinafter Sempra].
6. Enron Creditors Recovery Corp. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3,
Decision on Annulment (July 30, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/
EnronAnnulmentDecision.pdf [hereinafter Enron].
7. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Serv. Worldwide v. Republic of the Phil.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on Annulment (Dec. 23, 2010),
http://italaw.com/documents/Fraport-Annulment-Decision.pdf [hereinafter Fraport
I].
8. Mitchell v. Dem. Rep. Congo, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/7, Decision on
Annulment (Nov. 1, 2006), http://italaw.com/documents/mitchellannulment.pdf,
could also be seen as overly-exuberant, but there is no indication that this case,
whose facts were singular, gave rise to a trend.
9. Continental Casualty Corp. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9,
Decision on Annulment (Sept. 16, 2011), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID
/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2291_En&
caseId=C13 [Continental Casualty Corp.].
10. Togo Electricité v. Rep. of Togo, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/07, ICSID Case
No. ARB/06/07, Decision on Annulment (Sept. 6, 2011), http://icsid.worldbank.
org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC
2272_Fr&caseId=C75 [hereinafter Togo Electricité].
11. See, e.g., A.D. Redfern, ICSID – Losing its Appeal?, 3 ARB. INT’L 98, 109
(1987) (acknowledging that the ad hoc Committee’s decision in Klöckner, which
held that a Tribunal’s failure to deal with every question before it could lead to
annulment, may be applied to annul many other ICSID awards); W. Michael
Reisman, The Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration, 89
DUKE L.J. 739, 762 (1989) [hereinafter Reisman, Breakdown of the Control
Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration] (defining “hair trigger” as a mechanism of
sensitivity where nullification of an award would be automatically instated if a
defect, no matter how slight, were established); W. Michael Reisman, Repairing
ICSID’s Control System: Some Comments on Aron Broches’ “Observations on the
Finality of ICSID Awards,” 7 ICSID REV. – FOREIGN INV. L.J. 196, 200 (1992)
(arguing that the ad hoc Committee misinterpreted Article 52(3) when justifying
its conclusion that it must annul an award even without a material violation).
12. See, e.g., Compañia de Aguas del Aconquia S.A. v. Argentine Republic,

730

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[27:4

led many to believe that the annulment virus had been permanently
eradicated. For example, in 2005, the ad hoc Committee in CDC
Group PLC v. Republic of Seychelles 13 stated:
[T]here has been an evolution in the ICSID annulment case law and
scholarship away from Klöckner I and Amco Asia I that has culminated, in
our view correctly, in ad hoc Committees reviewing arbitral proceedings
only to the extent of ensuring their fundamental fairness, eschewing any
temptation to “second guess” their substantive result.14

However, only five years after CDC was decided, the lessons of
Klöckner I and Amco I appear to have been sufficiently forgotten to
enable the second viral phase of annulment decisions in 2010. In
Enron, Sempra and Fraport, the respective ad hoc Committees
succumbed to the temptation to annul decisions because of a
perception that the tribunal had got it wrong.
Even if the second viral phase is assumed to be finished,
experience suggests that, once the memory of this second phase has
faded, ad hoc committees may again find themselves unable to resist
the temptation of annulling awards that they consider to have been
wrongly decided. Given the availability of alternative fora for the
resolution of investment disputes,15 a further phase of excessive
ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 65 (July 3, 2002), 6 ICSID
REP. 340 (2004) [hereinafter Vivendi I] (“[A]nnulment under Article 52(1)(e)
should only occur in a clear case. . . . the failure to state reasons must leave the
decision on a particular point essentially lacking in any expressed rationale; and . .
. that point must itself be necessary to the tribunal’s decision.”); Wena Hotels Ltd.
v. Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Decision on Annulment, ¶
53 (Feb. 5, 2002), 6 ICSID REP. 67 (2004) [hereinafter Wena Hotels.] (positing that
the Tribunal’s reliance on “[in]appropriate criteria” in evaluating the merits of the
case would not have justified annulment); Mar. Int’l Nominees Establishment v.
Republic of Guinea, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, Decision on Partial Annulment, ¶
5.07–11 (Dec. 22, 1989), 4 ICSID REP. 79 (1997) [hereinafter MINE] (determining
that the failure of the Tribunal to deal with every question submitted to it, pursuant
to article 48(3) of the Convention, does not necessarily require annulment).
13. CDC Group PLC v. Rep. of Seychelles, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14,
Decision on Annulment (June 29, 2005), 11 ICSID REP. 206 (2007) [hereinafter
CDC].
14. Id. ¶ 35.
15. For example, investment disputes can be, and many are, settled by ad hoc
arbitration under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. See generally UNCITRAL
Arbitration Rules, adopted on Apr. 28, 1976, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral
/en/uncitral_texts/arbitration/1976Arbitrationrules.html. An award rendered by
such a tribunal is subject only to review by national courts in the supervisory
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annulments could result in irreversible damage to ICSID’s reputation
as the world’s pre-eminent forum for the settlement of investment
disputes.
In this article, we consider in Section I two preliminary questions:
(i) whether the Convention’s travaux préparatoires offer a
justification for an expansive interpretation of Article 52; and (ii)
whether annulments have in fact been problematically frequent
during the peak phases of nullification. We then discuss in Section II
how ad hoc committees have treated the three principal grounds for
annulment, and seek to show the similarity between the two rabid
phases of annulment.16 In Section III, we offer concluding
observations about the way forward.

I. TWO PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS
A. DO THE CONVENTION’S TRAVAUX OFFER ANY JUSTIFICATION
FOR AN EXPANSIVE INTERPRETATION OF ARTICLE 52(1)?
The answer to the question is: no.
There was relatively little discussion of Article 52(1) during the
negotiation of the ICSID Convention.17 The final text is in
substantially the same form as that proposed in the Preliminary
Draft.18
The drafting history suggests that annulments were intended to be
exceptional events19 and that the grounds for annulment in Article
jurisdiction in which, or under the law of which, the award was made. See
UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INT’L COM. ARB. art. 34 (2006). In most cases, the
only available grounds for review will be those set out under national law, which
often is based on the UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial
Arbitration. See id. (allowing national courts to review and annul awards that are
inconsistent with state law).
16. There are, in particular, similarities between the two rabid phases of
ICSID’s annulment history in relation to the treatment of manifest excess of power
under Article 52(1)(b). See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 52(1)(b).
17. Cf. INT’L CTR. FOR SETTLEMENT OF INV. DISPUTES [ICSID], 1 CONVENTION
ON THE SETTLEMENT OF INVESTMENT DISPUTES BETWEEN STATES AND NATIONALS
OF OTHER STATES: ANALYSIS OF DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE
FORMULATION OF THE CONVENTION 230–32 (1970) [hereinafter HISTORY OF
ICSID VOL. 1] (providing an early draft of the article).
18. Id.
19. For example, the Netherlands delegate stated that annulments “should be
confined to very rare cases because in the ordinary course of events[,] the award
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52(1) were to be more restrictive than the grounds laid down in the
New York Convention.20 The fact that the drafters anticipated a
paucity of annulment proceedings is also suggested by the absence of
any provision for a permanent body of Article 52 decision-makers21
and the restrictive eligibility requirements for persons to sit on ad
hoc committees.22
(i) Manifest Excess of Powers
The Preliminary Draft of the ICSID Convention provided that an
award’s validity could be challenged if “the Tribunal has exceeded
its powers.”23 This ground was amended to require that a Tribunal
must have “manifestly” exceeded its powers.24 The justification
given for this change was that the more restrictive wording would
help to avoid the “risk of frustration of awards.”25
The drafters of the Convention did not debate the meaning of the
word “manifestly.” Aron Broches, General Counsel of the World
Bank and principal architect of the ICSID Convention, stated that:
should be treated as final.” ICSID, 2 HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION:
DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION OF THE
CONVENTION pt. 2, at 852 (1968) [hereinafter HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 2, PT. 2].
However, it also appears that the drafters considered and rejected a proposal to
include specific language to “clearly indicate that the causes for annulment would
be exceptional.” Id. at 854.
20. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards art. 5, June 7, 1959, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38, 50 [hereinafter New
York Convention]; see also ICSID, 2 HISTORY OF THE ICSID CONVENTION:
DOCUMENTS CONCERNING THE ORIGIN AND THE FORMULATION OF THE
CONVENTION pt. 1, at 423 (1968) [hereinafter HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 2, PT. 1]
(“[I]t had been fully recognized that only limited recourse had been provided and
that acceptance of the binding character of the award went beyond what was
normally expected in respect of an arbitral tribunal.”).
21. See generally William Laurence Craig, Uses and Abuses of Appeal from
Awards, 4 ARB. INT’L 174 (1988).
22. HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 2, PT. 2, supra note 19, at 854–55 (“Mr. Burrows
(United Kingdom) stated that their suggestion was that a further ground of
ineligibility for membership of the Reviewing Committee should be possession of
the same nationality as any member of the Tribunal which rendered the award. The
reason was that these nullity proceedings were only for very extreme cases of
serious misconduct . . . .”).
23. HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 1, supra note 17, at 230.
24. Subsequent proposals to delete the word “manifestly” were defeated by a
vote. See HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 2, PT. 2, supra note 19, at 851–52.
25. HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 2, PT. 1, supra note 20, at 423.
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the expression “manifestly exceeded its powers” concerned the cases
referred to earlier as ultra petita, namely, where the Tribunal would have
gone beyond the scope of agreement of the parties or would have decided
points which had not been submitted to it or had been improperly
submitted to it. He added that the ad hoc Committee would limit itself to
cases of manifest excess of those powers.26

A particular example of “an excess of power” discussed by the
drafters was the failure by the Tribunal to apply the law chosen by
the parties. Broches confirmed that “failure to apply the right law
would constitute an excess of power if the parties had instructed the
Tribunal to apply a particular law.”27 However, the drafters
considered and rejected a proposal to add a ground of annulment for
“manifestly incorrect application of the law.”28
(ii) Serious Departure from a Fundamental Rule of Procedure
The basic formula of Article 52(1)(d) remained unchanged
throughout the drafting history of the ICSID Convention and its
inclusion was never challenged in principle.29
Broches stated that the term fundamental rules of procedure
“would comprise, for instance, the so-called principles of natural
justice e.g., that both parties must be heard and that there must be
adequate opportunity for rebuttal.”30 The preparatory works thus
“make it clear that only procedural principles of special importance
would qualify as ‘fundamental rules’” but they “do not give guidance
as to the serious nature of a violation.”31

26. HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 2, PT. 2, supra note 19, at 850.
27. Id. at 851.
28. Id. at 853–54. Broches also stated, in relation to a suggestion to expand the
scope of what is now Article 52(1)(d), that “if sub-paragraph (c) were expanded to
cover serious errors in the application of substantive law, it would be tantamount to
providing for an appeal, a step which had not thus far been contemplated.”
HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 2, PT. 1, supra note 20, at 340.
29. CHRISTOPH H. SCHREUER, THE ICSID CONVENTION: A COMMENTARY 888
(2nd ed. 2001).
30. HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 2, PT. 1, supra note 20, at 480. However, the
delegates expressly considered and rejected a proposal to “refer specifically to a
requirement that both parties must have a fair hearing.” HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 2,
PT. 2, supra note 19, at 853.
31. SCHREUER, supra note 29, at 970.
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(iii) Failure to State Reasons
In the Preliminary Draft of the ICSID Convention,32 the failure to
state reasons for an award was included as an example of a serious
departure from a fundamental rule of procedure. In subsequent
drafts, it was listed as a separate ground. It appears to have been
agreed that the requirement to give reasons was intended to include
both factual and legal reasoning.33
* * *
During periods of excessive annulment, ad hoc committees have
found ways to justify their unauthorized appellate review. The
explanation for this conduct cannot be attributed to either the
language or the drafting history of Article 52.34 Rather, ICSID’s
annulment history during its rabid phases shows that there is no
language that is immune to manipulation, and no textual safeguard
against ICSID-appointed international law experts bent on finding,
against common sense, a textual justification for what they want to
do.

B. HAVE ANNULMENTS DURING THE RABID PHASES
BEEN THAT FREQUENT?
The answer to the question is: yes.
During the 1970s, there were four ICSID awards and there were
no annulment proceedings.35
During the 1980s (the first viral phase), four of the nine ICSID
awards led to annulment proceedings, and 33% of the total awards
rendered were annulled, a shocking frequency.36
The 1990s was a calm period: of 18 awards, there were two
annulment proceedings; one of these was discontinued and the other
32. See generally HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 1, supra note 17.
33. HISTORY OF ICSID VOL. 2, PT. 2, supra note 19, at 851.
34. See generally Aron Broches, Observations on the Finality of ICSID
Awards, 6 ICSID REV. – FOREIGN INV. L. J. 321 (1991) (tracing the drafting of
Article 52 from its origins in the International Law Commission’s Draft
Convention on Arbitral Procedure of 1953).
35. See ICSID, THE ICSID CASELOAD: STATISTICS (ISSUE 2012-1), at 15 (2012)
[hereinafter ICSID CASELOAD], available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=CaseLoadStatistics.
36. See id.
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resulted in a rejection of the request.37
Since 2000, there has been a proliferation of both cases brought
before ICSID and annulment proceedings. Of 96 rendered awards
between 2001 and 2010, 26 annulment applications were registered.38
In 2010 alone, there were eight ad hoc Committee decisions39 and
four of these annulled the award in whole or in part.40 Thus, from
2001 to 2010, over one-quarter of the awards rendered by ICSID
tribunals led to applications for annulment, and, of these requests,
eight resulted in partial or total annulment of the award, another
phase of shocking frequency.41 The activist trend has continued in
2011: six annulment proceedings were registered during the first-half
of the year.42
37. See id.
38. See id.
39. See, e.g., Fraport I, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on Annulment
(Dec. 23, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/Fraport-Annulment-Decision.pdf;
Sociedad Anónima Eduardo Vieira v. Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/7; Republic
of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/7, Decision on Annulment (Dec. 10, 2010),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal
=showDoc&DocId=DC1851_Sp&caseId=C238 [hereinafter Sociedad Anónima
Eduardo Vieira]; Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Annulment (July
30, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/EnronAnnulmentDecision.pdf; Sempra,
ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on Annulment (June 29, 2010),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal
=showDoc&docId=DC1550_En&caseId=C8; Helnan Int’l Hotels v. Arab Republic
of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19, Decision on Annulment (June 14, 2010),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal
=showDoc&DocId=DC1631_En&caseId=C64 [hereinafter Helnan Int’l Hotels];
Compagnie d’Exploitation du Chemin de Fer Transgabonais v. Gabonese
Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/5, Decision on Annulment (May 11, 2010), 26
ICSID REV. 153 (2011); Rumeli Telekom v. Republic of Kaz., ICSID Case No.
ARB/05/16, Decision on Annulment (Mar. 25, 2010), http://italaw.com/
documents/RumeliAnnulment.pdf; Vivendi I, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision
on Annulment (July 3, 2002), 6 ICSID REP. 340 (2004).
40. Fraport I, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, at 111; Enron, ICSID Case No.
ARB/01/3, at 169; Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, ¶ 229; Helnan Int’l
Hotels, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19, ¶ 73(1).
41. See ICSID CASELOAD, supra note 35, at 15; see also UNCTAD, LATEST
DEVELOPMENTS IN INVESTOR-STATE DISPUTE SETTLEMENT 6 (2011), available at
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs//webdiaeia20113en.pdf (mentioning the four
annulments granted by ad hoc committees in 2010).
42. Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Decision on Annulment
(Feb. 14, 2012); Astaldi S.p.A. v. Republic of Hond., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/32,
Decision on Annulment (June 15, 2011); Commerce Group Corp. v. Republic of El
Sal., ICSID Case No. ARB/09/17, Decision on Annulment (Mar. 14, 2011),
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II. MISAPPLICATION OF ANNULMENT GROUNDS
Parties requesting annulment usually invoke three of the five
Article 52(1) annulment grounds: 52(1)(b), manifest excess of
power; 52(1)(d), serious departure from a fundamental rule of
procedure; and 52(1)(e), failure to state reasons.43 In many cases,
applicants will raise all three of these grounds in challenging a single
provision of an award.44
This Section considers these three grounds as applied and
misapplied during the two rabid phases of ICSID annulment.

A. MANIFEST ABUSE OF MANIFEST EXCESS OF POWER AS A
GROUND FOR ANNULMENT
Manifest excess of power is the most often-invoked and most
controversial ground for annulment. Every publicly available
decision includes an application for annulment on this ground.45
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal
=showDoc&DocId=DC1971_En&caseId=C461; Malicorp Ltd. v. Arab Republic
of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/18, Decision on Annulment (Feb. 7, 2011),
http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal
=showDoc&DocId=DC1911_En&caseId=C461; Nations Energy, Inc. v. Republic
of Pan., ICSID Case No. ARB/06/19 (Nov. 24, 2010); AES Summit Generation
Ltd. v. Republic of Hung., ICSID Case No. ARB/07/22, Decision on Annulment
(Sept. 23, 2010), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=
CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&DocId=DC1730_En&caseId=C114.
43. Christoph Schreuer, From ICSID Annulment to Appeal – Half Way Down
the Slippery Slope, 10 L. & PRAC. OF INT’L CTS. & TRIBUNALS 211, 214 (2011)
[hereinafter Schreuer, From ICSID Annulment to Appeal].
44. Duke Energy Int’l Peru Inv. No. 1 Ltd. v. Republic of Peru, ICSID Case
No. ARB/03/28, ¶ 91 (Mar. 1, 2011), http://italaw.com/documents/Dukev
PeruFinal_1Mar2011_Eng.pdf [hereinafter Duke Energy] (noting that the “practice
[of simultaneously invoking these three grounds] is entirely permissible within the
framework of Article 52(1), which permits a party to request annulment ‘on one or
more of the following grounds.’”).
45. See LUCY REED ET AL., GUIDE TO ICSID ARBITRATION, Annex 10, tbl.
III(B) (2nd ed. 2011); see also Sociedad Anónima Eduardo Vieira, ICSID Case
No. ARB/04/7, ¶ 57 (listing manifest excess of power as the first of three
arguments for annulment); Fraport I, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on
Annulment, ¶ 33 (Dec. 23, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/FraportAnnulment-Decision.pdf (noting that manifest excess of power was one of the
annulment grounds raised by the applicant); Duke Energy, ICSID Case No.
ARB/03/28, ¶ 124 (explaining that Peru argued that the Tribunal manifestly
exceeded its power); Togo Electricité, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/07, ¶ 9 (including
manifest excess of power as one of two grounds for annulment raised by Togo);
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The ICSID Convention departs from the New York Convention
and UNCITRAL Model Law, which allow a court to refuse
recognition or enforcement of an award when it deals with a
difference falling outside the terms of the submission to arbitration or
when it contains decisions on matters that exceed the scope of the
arbitration application.46 This ground is effectively identical to
Article 52(1)(b)’s excess of powers, except that it does not require
that the excess be “manifest.” The mis-adventures of ad hoc
committees arise from their mis-application of the word “manifest.”
The problem is not what ad hoc committees recite that they should
do in applying the term “manifest.” All ad hoc committees are
mindful to emphasize that the excess must be “manifest.” Some have
applied the professed standard faithfully; others have just recited
what they should do and then ignored the common sense meaning of
“manifest.”
The interpretation of “manifest” is subject to some legitimate
debate only insofar as there is a question whether the word
“manifest” relates to the ease by which the excess is perceived and/or
the gravity of the excess. In Wena Hotels, the ad hoc Committee
observed that “the excess of power must be self-evident rather than
the product of elaborate interpretations one way or the other,”
concluding that “[w]hen the latter happens the excess of power is no
longer manifest.”47 Other committees have perceived the requirement
Continental Casualty Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Decision on Annulment,
¶ 78 (Sept. 16, 2011), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?request
Type=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2291En&caseId=C13 (noting
Argentina’s request for annulment based on manifest excess of powers and failure
to state reasons).
46. New York Convention, supra note 20, art. V(1)(c) (“Recognition and
enforcement of the award may be refused . . . [if] [t]he award deals with a
difference not contemplated by or not falling within the terms of the submission to
arbitration, or it contains decisions on matters beyond the scope of the submission
to arbitration . . . .”); UNCITRAL MODEL LAW ON INT’L COM. ARB., supra note
15, art. 34(2)(iii) (“An Arbitral award may be set aside by the court . . . only if . . .
the award deals with a dispute not contemplated by or not falling within the terms
of the submission to arbitration. or contains decisions on matters beyond the scope
of the submission to arbitration . . . .”).
47. Wena Hotels., ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 25
(Feb. 5, 2002), 6 ICSID REP. 67 (2004); see also Repsol YPF Ecuador v. Empresa
Estatal Petróleos del Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/10, Decision on
Annulment, ¶ 36 (Jan. 8, 2007), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC617En&caseId=C203
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of “manifest excess” to relate to the extent and seriousness of the
excess rather than its clarity.48 The ad hoc Committee in Soufraki
aptly reconciled these views:
[T]he Committee believes that a strict opposition between two different
meanings of “manifest” – either “obvious” or “serious” – is an
unnecessary debate. It seems to this Committee that a manifest excess of
power implies that the excess of power should at once be textually
obvious and substantively serious.49

Ad hoc committees are therefore aware that decisions of Tribunals
should be annulled only where a serious error has been committed
and where such error is obvious. However, history shows that certain
ad hoc committees have been unable to resist the temptation of retrying cases. The path to error was paved by the Amco I ad hoc
Committee.
(i) Amco I
The Amco I ad hoc Committee began by emphasizing that it did
not intend to analyze whether the Tribunal erred in evaluating
pertinent law or facts:
Such scrutiny is properly the task of a court of appeals, which the ad hoc
committee is not. The ad hoc Committee will limit itself to determining
whether the Tribunal did in fact apply the law it was bound to apply to the
dispute. Failure to apply such law, as distinguished from mere
misconstruction of that law, would constitute a manifest excess of powers
on the part of the Tribunal.50

However, when the ad hoc Committee came to consider the
(finding that the excess must be “‘obvious by itself’” and ascertainable “simply by
reading the Award, that is even prior to a detailed examination of its contents. . .
.”); CDC, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/14, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 41 (June 29,
2005), 11 ICSID REP. 206 (2007) (“[T]he excess must be plain on its face for
annulment to be an available remedy. Any excess apparent in a Tribunal’s conduct,
if susceptible of argument ‘one way or the other,’ is not manifest.”).
48. See Vivendi I, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 115
(July 3, 2002), 6 ICSID REP. 340 (2004) (declaring the excess of power “manifest”
because of “the clear and serious implications of [the Tribunal’s] decision.”).
49. Soufraki v. U.A.E., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/7, Decision on Annulment,
¶40 (June 5, 2007), http://italaw.com/documents/SoufrakiAnnulment.pdf.
50. Amco I, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 23 (May
16, 1986), 1 ICSID REP. 509 (1993).
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substantive challenges made by Indonesia, it proceeded to do
precisely what it had foresworn. It scrutinized the manner in which
the Tribunal had assessed factual evidence and arrived at
conclusions.
The Tribunal had held that Amco had invested approximately $2.5
million in Indonesia in accordance with Indonesia’s investment
law.51 The ad hoc Committee performed a detailed analysis of how
the Tribunal had calculated this figure and determined that it was
incorrect.52
The ad hoc Committee stated:
[I]t was firmly established, in the view of the ad hoc Committee, firstly
that according to relevant provisions of Indonesian law, only investments
recognized and definitely registered as such by the competent Indonesian
authority (Bank Indonesia) are investments within the meaning of the
Foreign Investment Law (Law No.1/1967). . . .
It was also clearly established at the Vienna hearings that PT Amco failed
to obtain definitive registration with Bank Indonesia of all the amounts
claimed to have been invested by it in the hotel project.53

The Committee then concluded that the Tribunal had failed “to
seize the critical importance of PT Amco’s duty to register its
claimed inward investment” and that “[t]he evidence before the
Tribunal showed that as late as 1977, Amco’s investment of foreign
capital duly and definitely registered with Bank Indonesia in
accordance with the Foreign Investment Law, amounted to only US$
983,992.”54
Absent from the ad hoc Committee’s observations was any finding
that the Tribunal had failed to apply, or not sought to apply,
Indonesian law. It was undeniable that the Tribunal had applied
Indonesian law, and had quoted Article 1 of the Foreign Investment
Law in its award.55 The ad hoc Committee nonetheless ruled that, in

51. See id. ¶ 4.
52. Id. ¶¶ 90–98.
53. Id. ¶¶ 93–94.
54. Id. ¶¶ 95–96.
55. Amco Asia Corp. v. Republic of Indon., ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1,
Decision on Jurisdiction, ¶ 96 (Nov. 20, 1984), 1 ICSID REP. 413 (1993)
[hereinafter Amco I Award].
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view of the Tribunal’s failure to “to seize the critical importance of
PT Amco’s duty to register its claimed inward investment,” the
Tribunal had “clearly failed to apply the relevant provisions of
Indonesian law” and thus had “manifestly exceeded its powers.”56
The ad hoc Committee’s conclusion was thus that the Tribunal
had, in trying to apply Indonesian law, failed to understand it
correctly, or at least not in the manner that the ad hoc Committee
considered correct. It is not obvious that a failure correctly to apply
individual provisions of the applicable law amounts to an “excess of
powers” at all,57 but even assuming that this was somehow an excess
of powers, the ad hoc Committee made no attempt to explain, and
surely could not have explained, why any such excess of powers
should be considered “manifest.”58
No subsequent ad hoc committee would have the imprudence to
cite the Amco I ad hoc Committee as a model for the application of
56. Amco I, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, ¶¶ 95–96. The ad hoc Committee also
criticized the fact that the Tribunal had apparently included a loan in its
calculations and concluded that this was evidence of a failure “to apply Article 2 of
the Foreign Investment Law.” Id. ¶ 97. A review of the Tribunal’s award shows
that it had in fact cited Article 2 of the Foreign Investment Law in two paragraphs
of the decision. See Amco I Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, ¶¶ 228, 234. As
Schreuer puts it, “To speak of a non-application that is distinguishable from an
erroneous application in this context is not meaningful. The ad hoc Committee
simply came to a different interpretation and described what it perceived as an
erroneous application as a non-application.” SCHREUER, supra note 29, at 950.
57. See SCHREUER, supra note 29, at 964 (distinguishing between failing to
apply the law and an erroneous application of law, the former being an excess of
power, while the latter is not, and noting that the question of whether failure to
apply certain rules of international law amounts to excess of power is not yet
resolved).
58. Another transgression by the ad hoc Committee in Amco I has received no
attention, though it was even less justifiable than its conclusion that the Tribunal
had manifestly exceeded its power by not applying Indonesian law correctly. The
Amco I Tribunal held that the cancellation of the investor’s investment license was
unlawful due to due process violations regardless of the calculation of the amount
invested by Amco. The Tribunal took pains to state explicitly that its due process
holding was alternative to, and independent of, its holding on the amount invested.
See Amco I Award, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, ¶ 201. Faced with this seemingly
insuperable obstacle to resting annulment solely on its conclusion about the
amount invested, the ad hoc Committee chose to read the Tribunal’s award as not
really meaning what it said about the due process ground being an alternative and
an independent basis for finding that Indonesia had acted wrongfully. See Amco I,
ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, ¶¶ 81–83. It is difficult to see in this anything other
than an animus to annul.
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Article 52(1)(b). Yet, Amco I’s unjustifiable application of Article
52(1)(b) was effectively resurrected 25 years later by the ad hoc
Committees in Sempra and Enron.59
(ii) Sempra
In Sempra, the Tribunal had given in-depth consideration to
Argentina’s contentions that its actions were justified by Article XI
of the US-Argentina BIT60 (concerning measures necessary to deal
with emergencies) and/or the customary international law defense of
necessity (as set out in Article 25 of the International Law
Commission Articles on State Responsibility61). The Tribunal
analyzed the BIT, noting that “the Treaty itself did not deal with the
legal elements necessary for the legitimate invocation of a state of
necessity”62 and stating that “the Treaty provision is inseparable from
the customary law standard insofar as the definition of necessity and
the conditions for its operation are concerned.”63
The Tribunal then spent ten paragraphs discussing expert evidence
on whether Article XI of the BIT was self-judging, before
concluding:
In the light of this discussion, the Tribunal concludes that Article XI is not
self-judging and that judicial review is not limited in its respect to an
examination of whether its invocation, or the measures adopted, were
59. Also noteworthy from the new generation of annulment decisions are
Malaysian Historical Salvors v. Fed’n of Malay., ICSID Case No. ARB/05/10,
Decision on Annulment (Apr. 16, 2009), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/
FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1030_En&
caseId=C247, and Helnan Int’l Hotels, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19, Decision on
Annulment (June 14, 2010), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?request
Type=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&DocId=DC1631_En&caseId=C64. In both
of these decisions, the ad hoc Committees disagreed with the tribunals’ holding on
jurisdiction and adopted an arguably expansive view of Article 52(1)(b) to annul or
partially annul the awards. See Antonio Crivellaro, Annulment of ICSID Awards:
Back to the “First Generation”?, in LIBER AMICORUM EN L’HONNEUR DE SERGE
LAZAREFF 160–64 (Laurent Levy & Yves Derains eds., 2011).
60. Treaty Concerning the Reciprocal Encouragement and Protection of
Investment, U.S.-Arg., art. XI, Nov. 14, 1991, 31 I.L.M. 124 (1992).
61. Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Intentionally Wrongful Acts,
with commentaries, 2001 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N, 80, art. 25. The International
Law Commission is commonly referred to as the “ILC.”
62. Sempra Energy Int’l v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Award, ¶
378 (Sept. 28, 2007), available at http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet.
63. Id. ¶ 376.
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taken in good faith. The judicial control must be a substantive one, and
concerned with whether the requirements under customary law or the
Treaty have been met and can thereby preclude wrongfulness. Since the
Tribunal has found above that the crisis invoked does not meet the
customary law requirements of Article 25 of the Articles on State
Responsibility, it concludes that necessity or emergency is not conducive
in this case to the preclusion of wrongfulness, and that there is no need to
undertake a further judicial review under Article XI given that this Article
does not set out conditions different from customary law in such regard.64

The ad hoc Committee noted that “[a]s a general rule, a treaty will
take precedence over customary international law”65 and explained
why it considered there to be differences between Article XI and the
customary international law standard (and thus why it considered the
Tribunal to be wrong when it equated the Treaty standard with
customary international law). The Committee then seized upon the
above highlighted passage as evidence that:
The Tribunal has held, in effect, that the substantive criteria of Article XI
simply cannot find application where rules of customary international law
– as enunciated in the ILC Articles – do not lead to exoneration in case of
wrongfulness, and that Article 25 “trumps” Article XI in providing the
mandatory legal norm to be applied. Thus, the Tribunal adopted Article
25 of the ILC Articles as the primary law to be applied, rather than Article
XI of the BIT, and in so doing made a fundamental error in identifying
and applying the applicable law.66

Despite the Tribunal having analyzed both Article XI and
customary international law in a sub-section of the Award
comprising 28 paragraphs and entitled “[t]he plea of necessity under
Article XI of the Treaty,” the Tribunal’s “error”—in holding that the
legal obligations under Article XI and customary international law
were identical—was characterized by the ad hoc Committee as a
failure to apply the applicable law rather than an error in the
application of such law.67
64. Id. ¶ 388 (emphasis added).
65. Sempra, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/16, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 176 (June
29, 2010), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=CasesRH&
actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC1550_En&caseId=C8.
66. Id. ¶ 208.
67. Id. Although it appears that the Sempra ad hoc Committee would have
been prepared to do away with the distinction entirely in appropriate
circumstances, “[a]s a general proposition, this Committee would not wish totally
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The ad hoc Committee then moved on to the question of whether
the Tribunal’s error was “manifest.” The ad hoc Committee simply
asserted that its conclusion regarding the Tribunal’s supposed failure
to apply the BIT was “obvious from a simple reading of the reasons
of the Tribunal.”68
Thus, the Sempra ad hoc Committee effectively: (i) disagreed with
the Tribunal that the legal effect of Article XI of the BIT was the
same as the test of necessity under customary international law; (ii)
characterized that disagreement as a failure by the Tribunal to apply
the BIT rather than an incorrect application of the BIT; and (iii)
characterized that same error (or, rather, disagreement between the
ad hoc Committee and the Tribunal) as a manifest excess of powers
by the Tribunal.69 In short, the Sempra Committee’s approach was
identical to that of the Amco I Committee: paying no more than lip
service to the requirement that an excess of power be manifest.
(iii) Enron
In Enron, the ad hoc Committee went even further in eroding the
distinction between failure to apply the applicable law (which
amounts to an excess of power) and improper application of such law
(which does not).70
The issue again was the Tribunal’s treatment of the necessity
defense.71 In Enron, the ad hoc Committee agreed with the Tribunal
that Article 25 of the ILC Articles states the relevant test for the
defense of necessity under customary international law, i.e., that it
can be successfully invoked only if the act in question is “the only
way for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave
to rule out the possibility that a manifest error of law may, in an exceptional
situation, be of such egregious nature as to amount to a manifest excess of
powers.” Id. ¶ 164.
68. Id. ¶ 218.
69. See id. ¶¶ 218–19, 229 (finding a manifest excess of power and annulling
the Award based on the Tribunal’s failure to apply BIT Article XI as the
Committee deemed appropriate).
70. See Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 219
(July 30, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/EnronAnnulmentDecision.pdf.
71. Interestingly, the Enron Committee did not find that the Tribunal had
committed any annullable error by equating Article XI of the US-Argentina BIT
with the customary international law standard of necessity in Article 25 of the ILC
Articles. Id. ¶ 403.

744

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[27:4

and imminent peril.”72
However, the ad hoc Committee stated that the Tribunal had
unquestioningly accepted the evidence of the Claimant’s expert
(Professor Sebastián Edwards) that Argentina had not satisfied the
“only way” requirement:
The Committee considers it sufficiently implicit that the Tribunal’s
reasoning was that the Claimants (via the Edwards Report) had identified
alternative ways in which Argentina could have sought to address the
economic crisis, that the Tribunal was not satisfied that none of these
alternatives would have been available to Argentina, and that the Tribunal
was therefore not satisfied that the “only way” requirement in Article
25(1)(a) of the ILC Articles was satisfied . . . .
[A] reading of the cursory reasoning of paragraphs 300 and 308-309 of
the Award clearly suggests that the Tribunal accepted the expert evidence
of Professor Edwards over the conflicting expert evidence of Professor
Nouriel Roubini, to the effect that Argentina had other options available
to it for dealing with the economic crisis. From this, without any further
analysis, the Tribunal immediately concluded, that the measures adopted
by Argentina were not the “only way.”73

The ad hoc “Committee [found] that this reasoning of the Tribunal
does not address a number of issues that are essential to the question
of whether the ‘only way’ requirement was met”74 and therefore
concluded that the Tribunal:
did not in fact apply Article 25(1)(a) of the ILC Articles (or more
precisely, customary international law as reflected in that provision), but
instead applied an expert opinion on an economic issue. In all the
circumstances the Committee finds that this amounts to a failure to apply
the applicable law, as ground of annulment under Article 52(1)(b) of the
ICSID Convention.75

As Professor Schreuer has said:
This reasoning of the ad hoc Committee is truly baffling. The Tribunal
had correctly identified the governing law. It had also correctly identified
the relevant rule and had applied it. But the ad hoc Committee found an

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. ¶ 349 (emphasis added).
Id. ¶¶ 367, 376.
Id. ¶ 368.
Id. ¶ 377.
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excess of powers because it disagreed with the way the Tribunal had
interpreted that rule. More specifically, the ad hoc Committee found that
the “process of reasoning” applied by the Tribunal was defective and that
this constituted an excess of powers.76

Although the introductory section of the Enron decision contains
the disclaimer that “the ad hoc committee will annul the decision
only where the tribunal has manifestly exceeded its power,”77 the 41
paragraphs of the Decision culminating in annulment of the
Tribunal’s findings with respect to the necessity defense contain not
a single reference to the requirement that the Tribunal’s excess of
power be “manifest.”78
In each of Amco I, Sempra and Enron, despite protestations to the
contrary, the ad hoc Committees effectively ignored the requirement
that an excess of power must be “manifest” and exercised an
appellate jurisdiction based on perceived errors of law or reasoning.
The recent decisions in GDF79 and Continental Casualty80 suggest
a recognition that the Sempra and Enron Committees went too far
towards allowing annulment for “error of law.” The ad hoc
Committee in Continental Casualty81 stated:
The Committee considers that erroneous application of principles of treaty
interpretation is also in itself an error of law, rather than a manifest excess
of powers, at least where the error relates to the substantive issue before
the Tribunal for decision, rather than to an issue of the Tribunal’s
jurisdiction.
In the Committee’s view, it will amount to a non-application of the
applicable law for a tribunal to apply, for instance, the law of State X to
76. Schreuer, From ICSID Annulment to Appeal, supra note 43, at 220.
77. Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 69.
78. See id. ¶¶ 355–95.
79. Togo Electricité, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/07, Decision on Annulment
(Sept. 6, 2011), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=Cases
RH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2272_Fr&caseId=C75.
80. Continental Casualty Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Decision on
Annulment (Sept. 16, 2011), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?
requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2291_En&caseId=C13.
81. The ad hoc Committees in both Enron and Continental Casualty were
presided over by Dr. Gavan Griffith QC. Enron; Continental Casualty Corp. It is
notable that both ad hoc Committees retained the services of Dr. Christopher
Staker (in each case with the consent of the parties) to act as expert assistant to the
ad hoc Committee. Id.
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determine a dispute when the applicable law is in fact the law of State Y
or public international law. However, if the applicable law is the law of
State X, and if the tribunal in fact applies the law of State X, it is not the
role of an annulment committee to determine for itself whether the
tribunal correctly identified all of the provisions of the law of State X that
were relevant to the case before it, or whether the tribunal gave adequate
consideration to each of those specific provisions and to the relationship
between them, since this would be to venture into an enquiry into whether
the tribunal applied the law correctly. Questions as to the relevance of
particular provisions of the applicable law, and of their legal effect and
interaction with other provisions of the applicable law, go to the
substantive legal merits of the case and are within the power of a tribunal
to decide. A tribunal’s decision on such questions cannot amount to a
manifest excess of power.82

Continental Casualty was another case where the validity of
Argentina’s “necessity” defense under Article XI of the USArgentina BIT was at issue. In this case, the Tribunal had found the
majority of Argentina’s actions to be justified by Article XI and had
thus found no breaches of the BIT.83 The ad hoc Committee analyzed
Continental’s pleaded grounds for annulment in relation to Article XI
at some length, but concluded that “[e]ven if it could be established
by Continental that the Tribunal reached an erroneous interpretation
of Article XI of the BIT . . ., that would amount only to an error of
law, which is not a ground of annulment.”84

B. MISAPPLICATION OF SERIOUS DEPARTURE FROM A
FUNDAMENTAL RULE OF PROCEDURE AS A GROUND FOR
ANNULMENT
This ground of annulment has been much less abused than
“manifest excess of powers.” Although it is almost invariably
invoked by applicants, it has very rarely been accepted by ad hoc
committees.85 That said, certain worrying signs have emerged from
82. Continental Casualty Corp. ¶¶ 90–91. But see id. ¶ 142 (declining
expressly to decide whether “a manifest error of law may, in an exceptional
situation, be of such egregious nature as to amount to a manifest excess of
power”).
83. But cf. id. ¶¶ 63, 67 (noting that the Tribunal found a measure entered into
in December 2004 (Decree 1735/04) was not justified by Article XI and thus
breached the fair and equitable treatment standard).
84. Id. ¶ 133.
85. Article 52(1)(d) has been successfully invoked twice. See Amco Asia Corp.
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recent case law.
The drafters of the ICSID Convention raised the bar high. First,
the rule in question must be so essential that it can be qualified as a
fundamental rule of procedure.86 Second, the tribunal must have
committed such a grave violation of a procedural rule that it
constitutes a serious departure from that rule.87
The question of what amounts to a “fundamental rule of
procedure” has been addressed by several ad hoc committees.88 The
accepted standard equates to what can be termed rules of “due
process” or “natural justice” in the domestic law setting. Article 18
of the UNCITRAL Model Law, which provides that “the parties
shall be treated with equality and each party shall be given full
opportunity of presenting his case,” has been cited as an example of
such a rule.89
In Wena Hotels, the ad hoc Committee stated:
[Article 52(1)(d)] refers to a set of minimal standards of procedure to be
respected as a matter of international law. It is fundamental, as a matter of
procedure, that each party is given the right to be heard before an
independent and impartial tribunal. This includes the right to state its
claim or its defense and to produce all arguments and evidence in support
of it. This fundamental right has to be ensured at an equal level, in a way
that allows each party to respond adequately to the arguments and
v. Rep. of Indon., ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Decision on Annulment (Dec. 3,
1992), 9 ICSID REP. 9, 55–57 (2006) [hereinafter Amco II] (annulling the Second
Tribunal’s Decision on Rectification on the basis that it had been rendered on the
request of one party without giving the other party the opportunity to file its
observation); Fraport I, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on Annulment, ¶¶
218, 244–47 (Dec. 23, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/Fraport-AnnulmentDecision.pdf (annulling the award for a serious departure from the fundamental
rule of procedure entitling the parties to be heard).
86. See MINE, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, Decision on Partial Annulment, ¶
4.06 (Dec. 22, 1989), 4 ICSID REP. 79 (1997) (noting that the alleged erroneous
action must also be a serious departure from the fundamental rules of procedure).
87. Id. Ad hoc Committees have been mindful to remind the parties that both
of these requirements have to be met. See, e.g., CDC, ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4,
Decision on Annulment, ¶ 48 (June 29, 2005), 11 ICSID REP. 206 (2007); Wena
Hotels., ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 56 (Feb. 5, 2002),
6 ICSID REP. 67 (2004); MINE, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, ¶ 4.06.
88. See, e.g., MINE, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, ¶ 5.06 (discussing the
interpretation to be afforded the term “fundamental” and listing equality of parties
and the opportunity to present a case as examples of fundamental rules).
89. Id.
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evidence presented by the other.90

The Wena Hotels ad hoc Committee also addressed the question of
what amounts to a “serious departure” by endorsing the formula in
MINE that a departure is serious where it is “substantial and [is] such
as to deprive a party of the benefit or protection which the rule was
intended to provide.”91
However, two recent decisions show that there remains a danger
of this ground of annulment being interpreted more broadly.
(i) Enron
In Enron, the ad hoc Committee raised sua sponte the possibility
that the Tribunal had violated a supposed fundamental rule of “party
autonomy.” The Parties had agreed that “no further evidence would
be submitted after conclusion of the written pleadings except in
‘extraordinary circumstances.’”92 Subsequently, the claimants
submitted and the Tribunal accepted evidence without adverting to
any extraordinary circumstances.93
The ad hoc Committee accepted that a breach of the parties’
agreement on procedure would amount to a breach of the principle of
“party autonomy” and stated that it had no doubt that “the principle
of party autonomy is a fundamental rule of procedure.”94
As Schreuer has noted, there is a danger to elevating the concept
of “party autonomy” to the status of a fundamental rule of procedure:
Any detail from a party agreement on procedure, no matter how trivial,
could be seen as an expression of the fundamental rule of party autonomy.
In a wider sense, the ICSID Arbitration Rules operate by agreement of the
90. Wena Hotels., ICSID Case No. ARB/98/4, ¶ 57; see also Duke Energy,
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/28, ¶ 168 (Mar. 1, 2011), http://italaw.com/documents
/DukevPeruFinal_1Mar2011_Eng.pdf,
http://italaw.com/documents/DukevPeruFinal_1Mar2011_Eng.pdf (affirming the
definition of a fundamental rule of procedure as set forth by Wena Hotels); Fraport
I, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on Annulment, ¶¶ 180–86 (Dec. 23,
2010), http://italaw.com/documents/Fraport-Annulment-Decision.pdf (following
the approach taken in Wena Hotels and Duke Energy).
91. MINE, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, ¶ 5.05.
92. Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 194 (July 30,
2010), http://italaw.com/documents/EnronAnnulmentDecision.pdf.
93. Id.
94. Id. ¶ 195.
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parties and could hence be imported into this ground for annulment under
the label of party autonomy. In fact, almost any procedural rule can
somehow be traced back to one or another broader principle that may be
described as fundamental. The inevitable consequence would be that any
rule of procedure becomes fundamental.95

Professor Schreuer’s concern is valid. While some departures from
the parties’ agreement on procedure may amount to violations of due
process, others will not. Widely accepted concepts such as “the right
to be heard”96 or “principe de la contradiction”97 are sufficient to deal
with any genuine case of prejudice caused by a breach of the parties’
agreement on procedure.
Ultimately, the Enron Committee chose not to annul on the basis
of Article 52(1)(d). It found that any departure from the fundamental
rule of “party autonomy” which may have occurred was not serious
and did not justify annulment of the award.98
(ii) Fraport
Decided in December 2010, Fraport is the only ad hoc Committee
decision to annul an award in its entirety on the basis of Article
52(1)(d).99 Following the annulment, the claimant initiated another

95. Schreuer, From ICSID Annulment to Appeal, supra note 43, at 221.
96. See Helnan Int’l Hotels, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/19, Decision on
Annulment, ¶ 38 (June 14, 2010), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Front
Servlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&DocId=DC1631_En&caseI
d=C64 (“The right to be heard does not require a tribunal to consider seriatim and
evaluate expressly in its award every argument raised by each party.”).
97. See, e.g., EMMANUEL GAILLARD & JOHN SAVAGE, FOUCHARD, GAILLARD,
GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 947–48 (1999) (noting
the importance of due process at the international and state levels of arbitration,
and the inclusion of la principe de la contradiction in general due process).
98. See Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 197
(July 30, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/EnronAnnulmentDecision.pdf (“The
Committee is not satisfied that any departure from the principle of party autonomy
was serious, or that Argentina has been deprived of the benefit that that principle
was intended to provide.”).
99. See Fraport I, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on Annulment, ¶¶
180–86 (Dec. 23, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/Fraport-AnnulmentDecision.pdf (emphasizing that “the object and purpose of the power to annul an
award for ‘a serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure’ is to control
the integrity of the arbitral procedure” and stating that the concept of a
fundamental rule of procedure was “restricted to the principles of natural justice.”).
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arbitration against the respondent.100 As Fraport remains pending at
the time of this paper (and as the author’s law firm represents the
Philippines), only limited comments can be made.
At issue in Fraport was the Philippines’ Anti Dummy Law
(“ADL”) which required public utilities in the Philippines to have at
least 60% Philippine equity ownership (Section 1)101 and which
prohibited intervention by non-Philippine entities in the
administration, management, operation and control of Philippine
public utilities (Section 2A).102
The Tribunal found that Fraport did not have more than 60%
ownership of the concessionaire (PIATCO) and thus had not
breached Section 1, but that it had entered into secret shareholders’
agreements to control PIATCO in violation of Section 2A of the
ADL.103
The Tribunal considered and rejected an argument that the
Philippines had informally accepted the investment and thus waived
the right to rely on such breach.104 In so holding, the Tribunal
analyzed a Resolution of the Philippines Public Prosecutor not to
proceed with a prosecution of certain Fraport employees for breach
of Section 1 of the ADL together with certain related documents (the
“Prosecutor’s Resolution”), which had been submitted after the
proceedings had been closed.105 The Tribunal concluded that the
Prosecutor had no access to the secret shareholders’ agreements.106
In its application for annulment, Fraport alleged that the Tribunal
had breached its right to be heard by “admitting evidence [the
Prosecutor’s Resolution] and substantively relying upon it after the
100. See Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Serv. Worldwide v. Rep. of the Phil.,
ICSID Case No. ARB/11/12 (resubmitted Apr. 27, 2011) [hereinafter Fraport II].
101. See CONST. (1987), art. XII (Phil.) (requiring at least 60% Philippine
ownership before a public utility company may be certified).
102. An Act to Punish Acts of Evasion of the Laws on the Nationalization of
Certain Rights, Franchises, or Privileges, Comm. Act. No. 108, § 2-A (1936)
(Phil.).
103. Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Serv. Worldwide v. Rep. of the Phil., ICSID
Case No. ARB/03/25, Award, ¶¶ 319–27, 401 (Aug. 16, 2008).
104. Id. ¶¶ 387, 401.
105. See id. ¶¶ 368, 382 (stating that the primary purpose of the Tribunal’s
analysis of the Prosecutor’s Resolution and related documents was to assess
whether the Prosecutor had been aware of the secret shareholders’ agreements).
106. Id. ¶ 382.
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close of proceedings without giving Fraport an opportunity to
address the new material.”107
In its decision, the ad hoc Committee determined that the
Prosecutor’s Resolution was relevant to the interpretation of the
ADL and, in particular, the Tribunal’s conclusion that the ADL could
be breached by evidence of managerial control over PIATCO.108 The
Committee concluded that the Prosecutor’s Resolution had “singular
significance” to the outcome of the case.109 From the face of the
decision, it appears that this line of reasoning was developed by the
Tribunal sua sponte rather than following submissions by Fraport
(which had focused on the “waiver” issue referred to above).110
After endowing the Prosecutor’s Resolution with “singular
significance,”111 the ad hoc Committee concluded that the Tribunal
should have re-opened the proceedings to allow further submissions
on the proper construction of the ADL in light of the Prosecutor’s
Resolution112 and that its failure to do so constituted a serious
departure from a fundamental rule of procedure, which justified
annulment of the award.113
The Philippines set out its concerns with regard to the decision of
the ad hoc Committee in a letter dated June 2011 to members of
ICSID’s Administrative Council:
The Committee concluded that the Prosecutor’s Resolution was a critical
legal authority because it showed how Philippine authorities applied the
Anti Dummy Law – a line of reasoning that neither of the parties had
proffered. Without the benefit of hearing from the parties, the Committee
conducted its own analysis of the Prosecutor’s Resolution as evidence of
the application of the Anti Dummy Law. It concluded that the Tribunal’s

107. Fraport I, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 129
(Dec. 23, 2010), http://italaw.com/documents/Fraport-Annulment-Decision.pdf.
108. See id. ¶ 211 (considering whether Section 2A could be breached by “an
actual demonstration of managerial control” such that “the quantum of equity in
the company is irrelevant”).
109. Id. ¶ 243.
110. Id. ¶ 133. Fraport’s submissions focused on the “waiver” issue referred to
above and also included the subsidiary submission that “the Tribunal should have
afforded Fraport an opportunity to be heard about the legal question of whether a
finding by the Philippine Prosecutor bound the Tribunal.” Id.
111. Id. ¶ 243.
112. Id. ¶¶ 230–31.
113. Fraport I, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/25, ¶¶ 232, 245.
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application of the Anti Dummy Law in the Award was not in accord with
the analytic framework described in the Prosecutor’s Resolution.
Accordingly, in the Committee’s view, the Tribunal’s ruling against
Fraport in the Award was based upon an understanding of Philippine law
that had been rejected by the Philippine authorities.
This conclusion was wrong. Analytically, the Award was fully consistent
with the description of the Anti Dummy Law set out in the Prosecutor’s
Resolution, which addressed a violation of Section 1 of the Anti Dummy
Law and not, as the Committee mistakenly concluded, a violation of
Section 2A. Moreover, without question, the Tribunal applied
international and Philippine law to reach its conclusion. Under the guise
of a serious departure from fundamental procedure, the ad hoc Committee
effectively applied an appellate standard to set aside what it implicitly
concluded was based on an incomplete and mistaken view of Philippine
law. Thus the Committee concluded there was a basis to annul where
none existed.
Moreover, by not seeking submissions from the parties on this question,
which the Committee considered to be the most troubling issue before it,
the Committee denied due process and caused a serious and costly
miscarriage of justice.114

C. FAILURE OF COMMON SENSE IN APPLICATION OF FAILURE TO
STATE REASONS AS A GROUND FOR ANNULMENT
Parties have regularly invoked failure to state reasons when
seeking to annul ICSID awards. Ad hoc committees have rarely
annulled on this basis.
The duty to state reasons refers to a minimum requirement. The ad
hoc Committee in Vivendi I stated that “it is well accepted both in the
cases and the literature that Article 52(1)(e) concerns a failure to
state any reasons with respect to all or part of an award, not the
failure to state correct or convincing reasons. It bears reiterating that
an ad hoc committee is not a court of appeal. Provided that the
reasons given by a tribunal can be followed and relate to the issues
that were before the tribunal, their correctness is beside the point in
terms of Article 52(1)(e).”115 The ad hoc Committee in MTD v. Chile
114. Letter from the Office of the Solicitor General of the Rep. of the Phil. to
Members of Admin. Council (June 27, 2011) [hereinafter Letter from the Office of
the Solicitor General].
115. Vivendi I, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 64 (July
3, 2002), 6 ICSID REP. 340 (2004).
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confirmed that there is a “consistent jurisprudence of annulment
committees” in treating Article 52(1)(e) as addressing “an absence
instead of inadequacy or brevity of reasoning.”116
If the tribunal’s reasons enable the committee to understand how
the tribunal got from Point A to Point B, there is no failure to state
reasons.117 That sounds reasonable, but it is subject to abuse, because
almost any error of reasoning can, at bottom, be shown to contain an
absence of reasoning and can at bottom not enable the reader to
follow the tribunal from A to B.
Again, the Enron decision is a case in point. As noted above, the
ad hoc Committee annulled the Tribunal’s decision on the basis that
it was not satisfied that Argentina’s actions were not “the only way
for the State to safeguard an essential interest against a grave and
imminent peril”118 and hence, in the Committee’s opinion, the
Tribunal had manifestly exceeded its powers. However, the
Committee also went on to state:
even if the Tribunal did in fact satisfy itself that the “only way”
requirement in Article 25(1)(a) was not met on the evidence before it, it is
not apparent from the reasoning in the Award how or why the Tribunal
came to that legal conclusion. Even if, contrary to all appearance, the
Tribunal did apply the “only way” requirement in Article 25(1)(a), the
Committee considers that the Tribunal failed to state reasons for its
decision. This constitutes a ground for annulment under Article 52(1)(e)
of the ICSID Convention.119

The ad hoc Committee reached this conclusion despite the fact
that the Tribunal, composed of three experienced arbitrators, had
devoted 55 paragraphs of the award to a discussion of the various
aspects of the necessity defense, including the following statement:
116. MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. v. Rep. of Chile, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/7,
Decision on Annulment, ¶ 78 (Mar. 21, 2007), 13 ICSID REP. 500 (2008). This
approach has not been followed by all ad hoc Committees. See, e.g., Mitchell v.
Dem. Rep. Congo, ICSID Case No. ATB/99/7, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 41 (Nov.
1, 2006), http://italaw.com/documents/mitchellannulment.pdf (annulling for “a
failure to state reasons, in the sense that the inadequacy of reasons is such that it
seriously affects the coherence of the reasoning . . . .”).
117. MINE, ICSID Case No. ARB/84/4, Decision on Partial Annulment, ¶ 5.09
(Dec. 22, 1989), 4 ICSID REP. 79 (1997).
118. Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 349 (July 30,
2010), http://italaw.com/documents/EnronAnnulmentDecision.pdf.
119. Id. ¶ 378.
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It is thus quite evident that measures had to be adopted to offset the
unfolding crisis. Whether the measures taken under the Emergency Law
were the “only way” to achieve this result and no other alternative was
available, is also a question on which the parties and their experts are
profoundly divided, as noted above. A rather sad world comparative
experience in the handling of economic crises, shows that there are
always many approaches to address and correct such critical events, and it
is difficult to justify that none of them were available in the Argentine
case.
While one or other party would like the Tribunal to point out which
alternative was recommendable, it is not the task of the Tribunal to
substitute for the governmental determination of economic choices, only
to determine whether the choice made was the only way available, and
this does not appear to be the case.120

This constitutes the Tribunal’s reasoning on the question of
whether Argentina satisfied the “only way” test. It may be brief and
somewhat opaque, but to characterize it as non-existent is
inappropriate.121 Indeed, just two paragraphs before concluding that
“the Tribunal failed to state reasons for its decision,” the Committee
had itself characterized the Tribunal’s reasoning as “cursory.”122 This
is surely a more appropriate description.
Ad hoc committees have also deviated from the “absence of
reasons” standard by equating failure to state reasons with the
provision of contradictory reasons. The supposed justification for
this conflation is that two contradictory reasons negate one another
and thus constitute non-existent reasons.123
The potential for abuse is obvious. Arbitral awards running to
several hundred pages will frequently contain minor contradictions in
120. Enron Corp. v. Arg. Rep., ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, Award, ¶¶ 308–09
(May 22, 2007).
121. See Enron, ICSID Case No. ARB/01/3, ¶ 378 (“Even if, contrary to all
appearance, the Tribunal did apply the ‘only way’ requirement in Article 25(1)(a),
the Committee considers that the Tribunal failed to state reasons for its decision.”).
122. Id. ¶ 376.
123. Klöckner, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 116 (Oct.
21, 1983), 1 ICSID REV. – FOREIGN INVESTMENT L.J. 90, 125 (“As for
‘contradiction of reasons,’ it is in principle appropriate to bring this notion under
the category ‘failure to state reasons’ for the very simple reasons that two
genuinely contradictory reasons cancel each other out. Hence the failure to state
reasons.”).
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their reasoning. There is also the risk that tribunals’ attempts to
balance conflicting considerations may be mistaken for contradictory
reasons.124
Amco I again provides an example of overzealous review. The ad
hoc Committee noted that, under Indonesian law, the amount of an
investment was calculated by reference to “equity capital” and
excluded any loans made to an investor.125 The Committee also noted
that the Tribunal had been aware of this requirement but nevertheless
had apparently included a loan of US$1,000,000 in its calculation of
Amco’s investment without providing an explanation of why it had
done so.126 The ad hoc Committee therefore held that the Tribunal
had contradicted itself and thus annulled the Award for manifest
excess of powers and failure to give reasons.127
This level of scrutiny might be appropriate for an appellate body,
but it is inappropriate for an ad hoc committee to scour an award for
inconsistencies and then to annul on the basis that the Tribunal’s
inconsistent reasoning amounts to a failure to give reasons.
In a welcome development, the recent decision in Continental
Casualty points towards less intensive review in relation to
contradictory reasons. The ad hoc Committee stated:
for genuinely contradictory reasons to cancel each other out, they must be
such as to be incapable of standing together on any reasonable reading of
the decision. An example might be where the basis for a tribunal’s
decision on one question is the existence of fact A, when the basis for its
decision on another question is the non-existence of fact A. In cases
where it is merely arguable whether there is a contradiction or
inconsistency in the tribunal’s reasoning, it is not for an annulment
committee to resolve that argument. Nor is it the role of an annulment
committee to express its own view on whether or not the reasons given by

124. See Vivendi I, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 65
(July 3, 2002), 6 ICSID REP. 340, 358 (2004) (“It is frequently said that
contradictory reasons cancel each other out, and indeed if reasons are genuinely
contradictory so they might. However, tribunals must often struggle to balance
conflicting considerations, and an ad hoc committee should be careful not to
discern contradiction when what is actually expressed in a tribunal’s reasons could
more truly be said to be but a reflection of such conflicting considerations.”).
125. Amco I, ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1, Decision on Annulment, ¶ 97 (May
16, 1986), 1 ICSID REP. 509, 535 (1993).
126. Id.
127. Id. ¶¶ 97–98.
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the tribunal are logical or rational or correct.128

III.CONSEQUENCES AND SOLUTIONS
A. CONSEQUENCES
One can wonder whether excessive annulments matter, especially
to States, who are the sole parties to the ICSID Convention. Even
though the States did not, by their drafting, expose ICSID arbitration
to appellate review, it is States, more often than investors, who
benefit from excessive annulment decisions. There may, moreover,
be at least one virtue in the annulment threat: ICSID arbitral tribunals
are on notice to be careful and comprehensive and coherent in their
awards.
Exuberant annulments are, though, a problem for ICSID and for
actual and prospective ICSID parties. States set up the ICSID system
to assure foreign investors of an appropriate forum for investment
disputes. To the extent that such forum becomes inappropriate in a
way that contravenes the language of the Convention, the interests of
States are disserved. Moreover, errors by ICSID arbitrators already
are subject to a constraint: ICSID’s transparency, which causes an
ICSID tribunal to know that its award will likely be subject to public
scrutiny whether or not there is an annulment.
The costs of excessive annulment include, quite apart from the
millions of dollars in legal fees spent on annulment proceedings that
violate the language and spirit of Article 52, (i) millions of dollars in
compromised settlements agreed by parties out of fear of annulment
proceedings, and (ii) valid ICSID claims forewent because the risk of
a two-stage process tips the balance against bringing a claim.
Investment treaty arbitration engages the public interest in a
manner that commercial arbitration does not, and there is special
reason to promote consistent jurisprudence in investment
arbitration.129 In the absence of an appellate structure, ad hoc
128. Continental Casualty Corp., ICSID Case No. ARB/03/9, Decision on
Annulment, ¶ 103 (Sept. 16, 2011), http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/Front
Servlet?requestType=CasesRH&actionVal=showDoc&docId=DC2291_En&caseI
d=C13.
129. See, e.g., Stephan W. Schill, Crafting the International Economic Order:
The Public Function of Investment Treaty Arbitration and Its Significance for the
Role of the Arbitrator, 23 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 401, 408–409 (2010) (explaining the
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committees may believe they have a role to play in promoting
consistent jurisprudence, whether by annulling decisions they
consider to be incorrect or criticizing the merits of decisions but
leaving them intact.
Neither of these two options is desirable. Excessive annulment
would again lead the ICSID arbitration system to resemble “an
elaborate and expensive game of snakes and ladders,”130 which is
unattractive as a means of settling investment disputes. Even when ad
hoc committees do not annul, they can do damage by excessive
scrutiny of the merits. Several ad hoc committees in recent years have
“proceeded to a microscopic dissection of the award; [they have
identified] a number of problems with the award and [said] what the
award should have done,” before concluding that the flaws were not
sufficient for the committee to annul.131 One must wonder what effect
such dicta have on a State’s willingness to pay a substantial award
which has been torn apart but not annulled by an ad hoc committee.
The excessive scrutiny in recent decisions threatens to undermine
one of the attractions of ICSID arbitration. As recently as 2009,
Professor Schreuer wrote:
The self-contained and exhaustive nature of review procedures under the
ICSID Convention . . . serves the interest of finality of awards and
provides a clear advantage over other arbitration mechanisms. Awards
stemming from arbitration systems such as the ICC, the AAA or
UNCITRAL are subject to potentially protracted and costly review
procedures by the courts of the arbitration forum.132

In contrast, a 2010 survey of international experts133 on the choices
role of investment treaty arbitration as facilitating investment, creating jobs, and
“domesticating” remedies for actions of foreign investors, and the need, therefore,
for consistent arbitral jurisprudence).
130. Redfern, supra note 11, at 99.
131. Gaëtan Verhoosel, Annulment and Enforcement Review of Treaty Awards:
To ICSID or Not to ICSID, in 50 YEARS OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION: ICCA
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION CONFERENCE 14 ICCA CONGRESS SERIES 285, 306
(A.J. van den Berg ed., 2009).
132. SCHREUER, supra note 29, at 1103.
133. See M. Burgstaller & C.B. Rosenberg, Challenging International Arbitral
Awards: To ICSID or Not to ICSID?, 27 ARB. INT’L 91, 93 (2011) (“In August
2010, we distributed the . . . questionnaire to 198 international arbitration experts
based in England, France and the United States, as identified by the Global
Arbitration Review’s ‘Who’s Who of Commercial Arbitration [2010].’”). Most
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of forum in investment arbitration, received multiple responses to the
effect that “ICSID annulment proceedings have become almost
routine, are unpredictable, and go too far in the merits of the case.”134
In the immediate aftermath of Sempra and Enron, the study’s findings
were that “[o]nly a small minority of expert respondents favored
ICSID procedures over domestic procedures: 16 per cent as compared
to English law, and 10 per cent as compared to French or US law.”135
Although a snapshot survey does not tell us much about user
preferences, unless the recent trend towards a two-stage process is
checked, investors will inevitably be deterred from bringing valid
claims to ICSID arbitration.

B. SOLUTIONS
There is no easy solution to the problem of excessive annulments.
Amending Article 52 is not plausible. Under Article 66 of the
ICSID Convention, any proposed amendment to the Convention will
become effective only once “all Contracting States have ratified,
accepted or approved the amendment.”136 The prospects of achieving
such unanimity are virtually nil.
Changing the way that ad hoc committees are constituted is
unlikely. Ad hoc committees are, under the Convention, comprised
from a list designated by States,137 and as States are almost always
the parties seeking annulment, the exuberance for annulment may
partially be explained by the circumstances that lead to the
appointment by ICSID of ad hoc Committee members.
The question we are left with is: how best can we deliver ad hoc
committees from the temptation to exceed their jurisdiction under
Article 52?
respondents “had a negative view of the ICSID annulment procedures.” Id. at 94.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. SCHREUER, supra note 29, at 1265.
137. See ICSID Convention, supra note 1, arts. 13, 52. Pursuant to Article 52(3)
of the ICSID Convention, ad hoc Committee members must be selected from the
Panel of Arbitrators. The Panel of Arbitrators consists of persons designated by
Member States pursuant to Article 13(1) of the ICSID Convention. In addition,
under Article 13(2), the Chairman of the Administrative Council (i.e., the President
of the World Bank) has the power to designate up to ten persons to the Panel of
Arbitrators.
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Looking back, we can observe that the first wave of rabid
annulments subsided without ICSID taking any formal steps. One
must wonder whether the Center acted to stop the first wave by
conveying, by informal means, to certain ad hoc committee
members, particularly the chairmen of such committees, that
excessive annulments had to be curtailed and that the language and
spirit of Article 52 had to be respected.138 It is notable that Professor
Sompong Sucharitkul was appointed as President of the ad hoc
committees in Klöckner II, Amco II, and MINE. Those decisions are
credited with stopping the first wave of excessive annulments.139
One option that has been proposed is the issuance of guidelines or
an interpretive note by ICSID’s Administrative Council emphasizing
the limited nature of review under Article 52 and exhorting ad hoc
committees not to annul except in exceptional cases of serious
procedural injustice.140 Following the Fraport annulment, the
Philippines wrote to the Administrative Council suggesting that a
special task force be established to make recommendations as to
guidelines that could be issued by the Administrative Council to ad
hoc committees.141 The idea is attractive because it would allow
ICSID formally to exert pressure on ad hoc committees to respect
their limited jurisdiction.142 The issuance of such guidelines would
138. See Reisman, Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration,
supra note 11, at 207 (“It may be expected that use of the annulment procedure
would be a rare event because of the seriousness of the shortcomings against which
it is meant to be a safeguard. This still seems to be the case, since the annulment
procedure has only been invoked in three disputes before the Center. However, if
parties dissatisfied with awards regularly seek annulment such a practice may put
in doubt the features which make ICSID arbitration an attractive means of settling
investment disputes-namely its speed, comparatively low cost, and its
effectiveness.”) (quoting IBRAHIM F. I. SHIHATA, REPORT OF THE SECRETARY
GENERAL: TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE COUNCIL AT ITS TWENTY SECOND ANNUAL
MEETING 3 (1988)). These remarks were interpreted by Michael Reisman as “jawboning,” intended to have an “impact on subsequent members of ad hoc
committees who are effectively appointed by the Secretary General.” Id. at 208.
139. Christoph Schreuer, Three Generations of ICSID Annulment Proceedings,
in ANNULMENT OF ICSID AWARDS 17–18 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi,
eds., 2004).
140. See Jason Clapham, Finality of Investor-State Arbitral Awards: Has the
Tide Turned and Is There a Need for Reform?, 26 J. INT’L ARB. 437, 464 (2009)
(recommending that the interpretive note confirm that an award should be annulled
only for the most limited and fundamental errors).
141. Letter from the Office of the Solicitor General, supra note 114.
142. It has been suggested that the Administrative Council has the power to
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likely have an impact, at least over the medium-term. Over the
longer-term, however, guidelines are as vulnerable to misapplication
as is the language of Article 52.
Public criticism by members of the investment community has a
sure impact. The criticism of Klöckner I and Amco I undoubtedly
sensitized future ad hoc Committees to the undesirable consequences
of substituting their own decisions on the merits for those of the
Tribunal.143 History shows, however, that over twenty-five years the
heightened sensitivity wore off.
A new wave of criticism has arisen in the wake of the second
wave of excessive annulments and the decisions in GDF and
Continental Casualty suggest that a renewed cautious approach to
annulment applications is already with us.144 On the assumption that
the second wave has subsided, the challenge will be to break the
cycle and avoid a third wave.
Many ICSID parties (particularly Respondent States) will continue
to invoke their remedies under Article 52.145 If there is consistent
commentary and renewed jurisprudence to the effect that annulment
is to be granted only in exceptional circumstances of serious
procedural injustice and if cost awards are made against parties
submitting obviously unmeritorious applications, the number of
unmeritorious annulment applications should diminish and the third
wave, should it ever come, will be put off that much longer.

issue such a note under Article 6(3) of the ICSID Convention, which states: “The
Administrative Council shall also exercise such other powers and perform such
other functions as it shall determine to be necessary for the implementation of the
provisions of this Convention.” ICSID Convention, supra note 1, art. 6(3).
143. See Reisman, Breakdown of the Control Mechanism in ICSID Arbitration,
supra note 11, at 804 (discussing how the control problems stemming from
Klöckner and Amco were recognized and that administrative steps were taken in
response); see also Redfern, supra note 11, at 118 (stating that the effect of
Klöckner and Amco “has been to raise considerable doubts as to the finality of an
ICSID award and to show how readily such an award may be set aside, within the
ICSID system itself.”).
144. See generally, e.g., Crivellaro, supra note 59 (discussing the trend of ad
hoc committees reverting back to the more interventionist approach to annulment
decisions of the “first-generation” of such claims); Schreuer, From ICSID
Annulment to Appeal, supra note 43 (criticizing the recent, expansive annulment
approaches taken by many ad hoc committees).
145. Broches, supra note 34, at 376 (predicting this result).

